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In the literature about ‘problem of evil,’ there is some discussion about alleged connotations of the world ‘evil’. According to some, ‘evil’ is an expression that has no proper use in non-theistic worldviews: for, according to those who defend this view, something is evil if and only if it is contrary to the will of God, or the like. Moreover, according to some, the fact that ‘evil’ is an expression that has no proper use in non-theistic worldviews somehow insulates theistic worldviews from objections involving considerations about evil. I see at least difficulties for this claim.
First, even if it were necessarily true that something is evil if it is contrary to the will of God, that would not establish the use of the word ‘evil’ carries the connotation that the things to which the word applies are contrary to the will of God. Common usage could -- and, indeed, surely does -- establish that ‘evil’ can be synonymous for words like ‘bad’, ‘harmful’, and the like; and these words plainly do not carry any connotations that the things to which they apply are contrary to the will of God.
Secondly, even if it were true that the word ‘evil’ does carry the connotation that the things to which the word applies are contrary to the will of God, that would make no difference to the second state in comparison and evaluation of worldview. If theism fails on its own terms because it is committed to making logically contradictory claims about God and evil, then it fails on its own terms even though the word ‘evil’ carries the connotation that the things to which the word applies are contrary to the will of God.
Thirdly, even if it were true that world ‘evil’ does carry the connotation that the things to which the word applies are contrary to the will of God, we could simply recast the subject matter of our discussion in terms of ‘suffering’. In particular, when we come to the third stage, in the comparison of worldviews, we can ask whether theism or naturalism gives a better explanation of the data concerning the distribution of suffering and flourishing in our universe. In asking this question, we can carry our taxonomy familiar from discussion of evil: e.g., that there is (moral) suffering that is caused, at least in part, by human agency; and that there is (natural) suffering that is not caused, even in part by human agency. Moreover, in asking this question, it is clear that we can carry over all of the responses and distinctions made familiar in discussions couched in terms of ‘evil’: we can distinguish cases of horrendous suffering from more minor cases of suffering: and we can suppose that considerations about free will might go at least some way towards explaining why there are cases of (moral) suffering caused, at least in part by human agency. ~ Page 74
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