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To prove this, let me give you a new idea I want you to believe in. It’s not a supernatural one, but it makes the point about how ideas work. If I told you that “colourless green ideas sleep furiously,” would you believe me? Think about it for a moment and try to take the idea on board. At first it sounds okay, but eventually you see that the idea is meaningless. The statement is actually a famous sentence among scientists who study language and thinking. In 1957 the linguist Noam Chomsky www.chomsky.info constructed this perfectly grammatical but completely meaningless phrase to demonstrate that sentence structure alone is not enough to convey ideas. The content of the sentence follows all the rules of language, but as a sentence it does not compute in our minds. It is meaningless because of what we already know about color, ideas, sleep, and anger. Something cannot be both green and colourless. Ideas do not sleep. Sleep is not normally furious. These are concepts that already exist in our minds, and because the contradict each other, they dictate that Chomsky’s statement makes no sense. So any new ideas has to fit into existing frame-work of knowledge This is why some ideas can be so difficult to grasp. Science, for example, is full of ideas that seem bizarre simply because we are not used to them. It’s not that people are being stupid when it comes to science. Rather, many scientific ideas are just too difficult for many of us to get our heads around. On the other hand, folk beliefs about the supernatural seem quite possible. That’s why it is easier to imagine a ghost than a light wave made up of photons. We have seen neither, but ghosts seem plausible, whereas the structure of light is not something we can easily consider. ~ Page 8
Now consider a sequence of English words such as "Colourless green ideas sleep furiously." Individually, each word fits a general conceptual category: 'colorless' and 'green' and properties, 'ideas' are entities, 'sleep' is a process and 'furiously' is a manner. Thus, "colourless green ideas sleep furiously" fits the syntactic (i.e., conceptual-phonological) sequence Property-Property-Entities-Verb-Manner. Although the sentence as a whole is meaningless excerpt in highly contrived situations and poetic conceits, the word sequence does fit in syntactic (i.e., conceptual-phonological) structure of English. For the reverse sequence, "Furiously sleep ideas green colourless," there is no such higher-level conceptual-phonological structure in English that fits those words in that order.
This example is given, of course, because it was Chomsky's original example arguing that there is an autonomous syntactic structure in English. Cognitive grammar accounts for such cases better than Chomsky's account did, since Chomsky's theory of autonomous, semantic-free syntax did not account for the fact that "Colourless green ideas sleep furiously" does fit a permissible pairing of higher-level semantic concepts expressed in the given order. That is, 'green' is understood as a property modifying 'ideas', which are understood as entities. 'Furiously' is understood as a manner that modifies 'sleep', which is understood as a process. There is a partial semantics that is understood when those words with their meanings are put together in that order. The theory of cognitive linguistics accounts for that naturally. ~ Page 505/506 "Philosophy in Flesh" - George Lakoff/Mark Johnson
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